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Abstract
Exploring Tax Evasion in the Context of Political Uncertainty
We present a model of agents facing the uncertainty of two future forms of govern-
ment who are able to insure against this uncertainty by hiding funds from taxation.
In order to choose whether or not to hide funds from taxation, agents need to know
policy choices that each government would make should it come to power. But each
government, before it could make its decision, would need to know the choices of the
agents who would, for example, produce tax revenues. This informational tension
is resolved endogenously. We derive the resulting level of tax evasion in society and
the optimal choices made by the potential governments. We examine how changes in
governmental structure would a¤ect the level of tax evasion, and how that, in turn,
would a¤ect a particular form of capital ight.
JEL Classications: P37, P26, P27, K42
Key Words: Tax evasion, political uncertainty, economic uncertainty, policy un-
certainty, economies in transition
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1. Introduction
Between 1990 and winter 2011, thirty-nine incumbents were replaced in a total of
fty-two elections in the eight Central Eastern European countries that joined the
European Union in 2004.1 These frequent electoral changes, often bringing reversals
in ideological orientations, created a climate of political instability as they often
resulted in governments pursuing di¤erent social and economic policies than their
predecessors.2 Evidence that economic policy changes have an impact on business
decision makers can be found, for example, in the BEEPS II data base. Turning
to the broader group of twenty-six economies in transition covered in this study,
hundreds of respondents from each of these countries were asked many questions,
including the following: How great an obstacle to the operation and growth of your
business is economic policy uncertainty? In twenty-two of those countries, more than
fty per cent of the respondents stated that economic policy uncertainty was either
a moderate or a major obstacle to the operation and growth of their business.3
Of course, the post-Soviet-type economies in transition do not have a monopoly
on political uncertainty. In Western Europe, for example, incumbents in Portugal,
Spain, France and Greece, to note only four, were even more recently replaced. Indeed,
according to a recent paper by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012), who construct several
1See Kornai (2006, Table 4) for the list of the thirty governmental turnovers in these countries be-
tween 1990 and 2004. These eight economies in transition were the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland,
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. Using the same methodology and countries, and
extending the time period to March 2011, we nd thirty-nine instances in which incumbents were
replaced in a total of fty-two elections.
2We o¤er another comment on political instability, this time relating to Ukraine, a post-Soviet
economy in transition. In Ukraine, ahead of the presidential election in January 2010, policy dif-
ferences among the top contenders included whether or not to change the constitution to return to
presidential rule, whether or not to pursue NATO membership, and whether or not to attempt to
renegotiate gas prices with Russia.
3See BEEPS II Interactive Dataset, EBRDWorld Bank, 2002. The question can be found under
the heading Governance and Anti-Corruption. We excluded Turkey from the panel of countries,
leaving the twenty-six economies in transition.
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novel indices of policy uncertainty, policy uncertainty is responsible for a growing
proportion of the more general category of economic uncertainty.4 Their paper also
documents that U.S. policy uncertainty increases at moments of federal elections.
Clearly, at most election moments in most countries, there is uncertainty about the
policies of the government that will emerge as the victor. In the post-communist
period, however, both political instability and divergent ideologies were pervasive
features of the economies in transition, and it is for this reason that we set our
problem in their context, although the implications of our analysis are applicable
more generally.
All the economies in transition su¤ered immediate drops in output, with real GDP
falling for all of them until 1994. Furthermore, only three countries (Poland, Slovenia
and Slovakia) had equal or higher real GDP in 1999 than they did in 1989.5 The
recognition that the economies in transition had outdated capital stocks and pro-
duction methods, and needed thorough redesign in every area, e.g., economic, legal,
political, suggests the scope of the problem that any government in that group of
countries had to confront. With no recent tradition of democratic government, and
in some cases no tradition of democratic government at all, and with the opportunism
that the turmoil and early privatization e¤orts created, it is not surprising that some
of the new governments were more benevolent and focused on improving their coun-
tries and others were not. It is in this context that the role of uncertainty becomes
especially important to agents in the economies in transition. The uncertainty con-
cerning the various possible future policy choices of the government not only a¤ected
the economic decisions of the agents, but also created political pressures in support
of di¤erent governments. Also during this time, and as a consequence of agentseco-
4See the references in this paper for background reading on policy uncertainty and economic
outcomes.
5See EBRD Transition Reports, various years, and see Campos and Coricelli (2002).
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nomic decisions, the economies in transition exhibited generally heightened, albeit
varying, levels of tax evasion as well as capital ight. Because of the policy uncer-
tainty during this period, agents were forced to make decisions in the absence of
knowing whether the next government would be more or less benevolent, more or less
democratic, more or less corrupt, or more or less able and willing to pursue economic
growth and infrastructure development.
How would economic agents in an economy in transition have dealt with the sig-
nicant economic policy uncertainty that they faced? Would this policy uncertainty
have induced acts by these agents that would have undermined or impeded the devel-
opment of stable market-oriented democracies? In this paper, we attempt to answer
these questions by investigating the degree to which uncertainty concerning future
governmental policy induces tax evasion on the part of agents and how this, in turn,
has an impact on economic development.
In our model we imagine agents in a country in an early stage of transition from
a planned to a market economy and suppose the transfer of property rights, once
held by the state, has already occurred. However, the transition is still in progress,
and the nature of the governments future policies is unknown to the agents. In
particular, we assume that the agents believe that, due to a variety of reasons, the
present government may evolve into either a benevolent government or a corrupt
government. Each agent is forced to make economic decisions relating to his rm
prior to the knowledge of which government will come into existence. The agent
must choose whether or not to shelter some of the rms funds out of the reach of
the tax authorities to compensate for the uncertainty he faces. In choosing whether
or not to hide funds from taxation, and how much to hide, the agent needs certain
information. We assume that the agent needs to know, among other things, the
probability that each government would come into existence and what each of the
governments would do if it did come into existence. Knowing these things, each agent
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makes his economic choice, and collectively these choices yield both the tax revenue
that would go to the ensuing government, and the level of tax evasion, denoted by
the proportion of agents who hide funds from taxation. On the other hand, agents
believe that each government, should it come into existence, will optimize its own
objectives. These objectives may depend on the level of tax evasion and will be
limited by the tax revenues provided by the agents. However, the level of tax evasion
level itself will be a¤ected by the decisions of the ensuing government. Thus, the
agents need the governmentsdecisions to solve their problems and the governments
need the agentsdecisions to solve their problems. The tension between the agents
and governments is resolved by endogenizing the probabilities that each government
will come into existence, thus bringing these two sets of decisions into accordance.
The result of the equilibrium is to produce the level of tax evasion in the society, and
should the benevolent government come into existence, the optimal level of investment
in infrastructure this government would choose.
To investigate some policy implications of our model, we next explore the impact
of changes in the models parameters on the level of tax evasion and the benevolent
governments investment in infrastructure. We then dene a specic type of capital
ight within the context of our model and show how it would be a¤ected by changes
in the models parameters.
In the context of the literature on the rule of law in transition economies, most
models investigating the decisions of agents in transition economies to steal start
with a benchmark case in which the agents face a known type of government. The
agent optimizes given the existing government, and then the problem is re-solved
under the assumption of a di¤erent form of government. The agentsdecisions in the
two situations are then compared. Although agents make decisions in two di¤erent
contexts, there is no self-awareness on the part of the agents that the government
might be of di¤erent types. Examples of studies in this tradition include Polishchuk
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and Savvateev (2004), Roland and Verdier (2003), Sonin (2003), and Katz and Owen
(2009). A particular type of government, known to the agents, is also assumed in
Grossman (1995) and Alexeev, Janeba and Osborne (2004), who focus on "maas"
competing with the state for entrepreneurial rents. Dixit (2004), who suggests a
principal-agent model to capture the intent of a government to induce e¢ ciency in
society, also assumes a given governmental form, known to the agents. Ho¤ and
Stiglitz (2004) take a di¤erent tack by assuming agents face uncertainty regarding the
form of government that will arise. They endogenize the probability of occurrence
of these governments using a consistency requirement among the agents, and nd
that the uncertainty of governmental form leads to multiple solutions for the crime
level. In their model the agents do not consider an active government in making their
choices.
We contribute to the literature on the rule of law in transition by considering the
impact of political uncertainty on tax evasion in a broader context than the literature
mentioned above. The considerations that the agents face in our model include not
only the uncertainty of the future form of government, but also the awareness that
their collective decisions have an impact on which government will come into existence,
and also on what each government would do if it did come into existence. Taking these
awarenesses into account, we derive the level of tax evasion resulting from them. We
further examine how changes in this level of tax evasion would be a¤ected by changes
in the parameters describing these governments. This leads us to o¤er certain policy
suggestions. We are also able to investigate how changes in a particular type of capital
ight would relate to changes in the parameters.
We also contribute to the literature on the role of institutions in transition (for
example, Djankov and Murrell (2002), McMillan (2002) and Bevan and Estrin (2004),
and to that stressing the importance of institutional arrangements (for example,
Shleifer and Vishny (1998), and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002,
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2003)). We add to this literature by showing that di¤erent economic outcomes are to
be expected when we allow agents to make choices in the face of the uncertainty as
to which institutional arrangements will prevail.
We present our model in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss our results and o¤er
our conclusions.
2. Model
2.1. The Agents Problem
We begin by assuming that all agents believe that the present government is in ux
and will evolve by the end of the period into one of two possible forms that are known
to the agents. We designate the two forms as G and B. G is a benevolent government
that is concerned with determining its growth rate r; r 2 R; so that it maximizes its
objective function. That objective function depends on growth and the level of tax
evasion (LTE), albeit constrained by its tax revenue and the costs associated with
generating growth. B is a corrupt government that is interested in maximizing the
di¤erence between its tax revenue and its costs of maintaining the status quo for its
own purposes. While both G and B punish tax evasion, B chooses the severity by
which it punishes tax evasion in order to maximize its objective function. Thus, at
the outset, agents must make decisions in the face of the uncertainty of governmental
form, and also with the awareness that their choices will alter the tax revenues and
the LTE, and hence the decisions made by the particular government that does come
into being. In fact, the ultimate choice of governmental form may itself depend on
the collective decisions of the agents.
There is a continuum of expected value maximizing agents a; a 2 [0; 1]; each
of whom owns one rm, the value of which is normalized to 1: Operating a rm
honestly might turn out to be unrewarding if G were to come into existence and, due
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to shortfalls in tax revenue, could only o¤er a negative growth rate. In this case,
it could be benecial for the agent to hide some of the rms funds from taxation
to insure against this potential loss. On the other hand, should the agent choose to
insure against this loss by such hiding of funds and B were to come into existence and
the agent were caught hiding funds to avoid taxation, the result could be severe. This
motivates us to begin our model by assuming that the agent must decide whether
or not to hide funds of the rm from taxation and, if he chooses to hide them, the
amount to hide. We let a; a 2 [0; 1]; be the proportion of the rms funds that agent
a chooses to hide from taxation. We assume that the probability that an agent who
hides a will be caught is given by a: This probability of being caught is invariant to
the subsequent form of government.
We rst consider the outcomes for the agent should G come into existence. If
agent a chooses to hide a > 0 proportion of the rm and is not caught, he keeps the
hidden funds a; and the remainder of the rm, which we assume is honestly run, at
the end of the period is worth (1  t)(1  a)(1+ r); where t; t 2 [0; 1]; is the tax rate
and r; r 2 R; represents the impact of the economic growth generated by G. If agent
a is caught, then the agent must return the hidden funds to the government, plus pay
a penalty i.e., he must pay back to the government a(1 + );  > t: The part of the
rm not shielded from taxation, which we assume to have been run honestly, will be
taxed at the rate t; and, at the end of the period, will be worth (1  t)(1  a)(1+ r):
Thus, agent a retains (1  t)(1  a)(1+ r)  a of the rm at the end of the period.
If agent a chooses not to hide funds (a = 0); then the rm will be worth (1 t)(1+r)
at the end of the period: Under G, the expected value to agent a of hiding a > 0
can be written as E1(a) = (1   t)(1 + r)   a[a(1 + ) + (1   t)(1 + r)   1]: Under
G, the expected value to agent a of hiding a = 0 is E1(0) = (1  t)(1 + r):
We now consider the outcomes for the agent should B come into existence. If
agent a chooses to hide a > 0 and is not caught, he pockets a and the remainder of
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the rm is honestly run and worth (1  t)(1  a) at the end of the period, where t is
the same tax rate as in G. Since B does not create a climate conducive to economic
growth, the value of the rm remains constant. If agent a is caught hiding funds,
then he is punished by having to pay a penalty f; f 2 [t; f0]; where f0  1+ ; on the
entire rm to the government. If agent a chooses not to hide funds, then the rm is
worth (1  t): Under B, the expected value to agent a of hiding a > 0 can be written
as E2(a) = (1   a)(1   t) + a(1   f) + a(1   a)t: Under B, the expected value to
agent a of hiding a = 0 is E2(0) = (1  t):
To complete the calculation of the expected value for agent a, agent amust ascribe
a probability to the coming into existence of G or B. We let ;  2 [0; 1]; represent
the probability of G coming into existence, and (1   ) the probability of B coming
into existence. Given ; the expected value to agent a of hiding a > 0; E(a) =
E1(a) + (1  )E2(a); can be written as
E(a) = (1  t)(1 + r) + (1  )[a(1  f) + (1  a)(1  t)] +
af(1  a)t  [a(1  t+ ) + r(1  t)]g: (2.1)
Given ; the expected value to agent a of hiding a = 0 is E(0) = E1(0) + (1  
)E2(0); which can be written as
E(0) = (1  t)(1 + r) + (1  )(1  t): (2.2)
In these expressions, t and  are taken to be parameters, but r is to be determined
by G should it come into existence, and f is to be determined by B should it come
into existence. Conditional on ; r, and f; the optimum value of a; denoted by  a;
is summarized in the following proposition. The proof of this proposition and all
subsequent propositions can be found in the Appendix.
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Proposition 1. Given ; r; and f;  a =
8<: 1 if a < b(; r; f)0 if a  b(; r; f)
where b(; r; f) = t (1 t)r
f+(1+ f) :
Although agents believe that r and f are to be chosen optimally by G and B,
respectively, the value of  should reect the agentscommon view of the probability
that G will come into existence. The way the agents determine  depends on the
process that will lead to the selection of G or B, as well as the decisions that these
governments would make should they come into existence. In the next section, we
address the way in which  is endogenized and reevaluate  a using this derived form
of . (The notation  a will remain when we subsequently insert the optimum values
of ; r; and f:)
2.2. The Conditional Level of Tax Evasion and Endogenization of 
We begin by evaluating the conditional LTE. By indexing agent a on the probability
that the agent will be caught, we are allowing that some agents are better at hiding
funds from taxation than others. How they are distributed in society is assumed to be
given by the distribution function H(a); a 2 R; where H(a) = 0 for a  0; H(a) = 1
for a  1; and H(a) is continuous. The LTE conditional on ; r; and f; denoted by
K(; r; f); is given by the proportion of agents that hide funds given ; r; and f: It
follows from P1 that K(; r; f) =
b(;r;f)R
0
dH(a) and 0  K(; r; f)  1: (Cet. par.,
K(; r; f) is decreasing in the growth rate r:) We now address :
The value of  must be determined before agents can decide what proportion,
if any, of the rm to shelter from the tax authorities. At the outset, agents have
no information about the LTE, tax revenues, or government policies, but can decide
how they would determine  when such information becomes available. Also at the
outset, before deciding whether or not to hide funds, we assume all agents prefer higher
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growth rates and lower levels of tax evasion. Since Gs objective is to produce higher
growth rates and lower levels of tax evasion, we assume that agents would be more
supportive of G the more they perceive G to be successful in achieving its objectives.
That is, we assume that agents perceive  to be a function of the growth rate and the
LTE, increasing in the rst and decreasing in the second. The proportion of honest
agents, 1  K(; r; f); is decreasing in the LTE and, from the preceding paragraph,
it follows that it is increasing in the growth rate.6 Thus, this function can serve as
a basis for determining : We proceed to endogenize  by assuming that agents will
agree on the value of  that satises  = 1 K(; r; f):
We next establish the solution to the equation  = 1  K(; r; f): To emphasize
the conditionality of this solution, we denote it by (r; f) and the resulting conditional
LTE as K(r; f):
For the remainder of the model, we set H(a) = a for a 2 (0; 1): When H(a) is
uniform, K(; r; f) = b(; r; f) for b(; r; f) 2 (0; 1); K(; r; f) = 0 for b(; r; f) 
0 and K(; r; f) = 1 for b(; r; f)  1: Several results hold for other distribution
functions as we note in our concluding section.
Proposition 2. Given r and f
(a) If r  t=(1  t); then (r; f) = 1:
(b) If r < t=(1   t); then (r; f) is the unique root in [0; 1) satisfying (f   1  
)2   [f   (1 +    f)  (1  t)r] + f   t = 0:
Having established the unique root (r; f); we now return to P1 and evaluate  a
using this value. We present the results in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Given r and f
(a) If r  t=(1  t); then  a = 0 for all a:
(b) If r < t=(1  t); then  a = 1 if a < 1  (r; f) and  a = 0 if a  1  (r; f):
6As a shorthand, we refer to agents who do not hide funds from taxation as honest.
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Having shown the way in which (r; f) and  a depend on r and f; agents must
now consider the way in which r and f would be chosen by G and B, respectively.
2.3. Determining Optimum Choices for G and B
Agents believe G and B would determine the optimum values of r and f; respectively,
if they were to come into being. The agents derive these values by assuming, in turn,
that each government would optimize its objective function if it were to come into
existence. We begin with G.
If G were to come into existence, the agents clearly would know this. Thus, the
only uncertainty the agents would face when considering how much to hide would
be whether or not they would be caught. Using the expected values for agent a
given in subsection 2.1 above under the condition of Gs existence, agent a would
have to evaluate the conditions under which he would hide or not hide funds. These
evaluations would lead to the results of the previous subsections when  is set equal
to 1. That is, under G,  a = 1 if a  [t   (1   t)r]=(1 + ) and 0 otherwise.
Under these circumstances, b(; r; f) becomes t (1 t)r
1+
which we denote by b1(r): The
corresponding conditional LTE is denoted by K1(r): It follows that K1(r) = b1(r)
for [t   (1 + )]=(1   t) < r < t=(1   t); K1(r) = 1 for r  [t   (1 + )]=(1   t)
and K1(r) = 0 for r  t=(1   t): Thus, the conditional LTE K1(r) is non-increasing
in r, and therefore the proportion of honest agents is a non-decreasing function of
r: Since Gs objective function is assumed by the agents to be the weighted sum of
the growth rate r and the proportion of honest agents, this objective function is an
increasing function of the growth rate r: Consequently G will choose r as large as
possible subject to its scal constraint. This constraint is determined by Gs tax
revenue T1(r); minus the cost, C(r); associated with producing the growth rate r:
The tax revenue T1(r) is composed of revenue from the honestly run rms as well as
from the penalties levied when those hiding funds from taxation are caught. Thus,
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T1(r) =
1R
0
[a a(1+)+ t(1  a)(1+r)]dH:We next present the explicit form of T1(r):
Proposition 4. T1(r) =
8>>><>>>:
t(1 + r) if r  t=(1  t)
(1 + )=2 if r  [t  (1 + )]=(1  t)
1+
2
b21(r) + t(1 + r)[1  b1(r)] if t (1+)1 t < r < t=(1  t)
where b1(r) =
t (1 t)r
1+
:
Because the objective function is increasing in r, G will choose r as the largest r
such that T1(r)  C(r):
If we assume that C(r) is a convex increasing function of r with derivatives
Cr( 1) = 0 and Cr(1) = 1; then G will choose r as the largest r such that
T1(r) = C(r): We let r be the solution.
P4 demonstrates that the tax revenue function is constant up to the value r =
t (1+)
1 t and then becomes a convex parabola, initially decreasing, reaching a minimum
and then increasing to the value r = t=(1   t); beyond which it becomes a linear
increasing function of r: To better understand the shape of T1(r); we stress that this
shape is the input to Gs considerations in choosing the optimum value of r: From
this perspective, every agent would hide funds if b1(r) = 1; i.e., if r  t (1+)1 t : As soon
as r exceeds this value, some agents cease to hide funds, that is, they become honest.
For each agent who becomes honest, the change in tax revenue that G anticipates is
made up of the di¤erence between the new tax paid by the now-honest agent and the
loss of penalty payment that that agent, as a former tax evader, would have paid if he
had been caught. Since the value of r that immediately precedes t (1+)
1 t is negative,
the tax revenue would be based on a reduced value of the rm, which is less than
the amount G would anticipate if the agent had been dishonest and had been caught.
Thus, there would be an anticipated loss of revenues. As r increases and additional
agents become honest, this di¤erence remains negative until r is su¢ ciently large so
that the additional tax revenue exceeds the loss of the penalty payments.
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The expression for T1(r) explicitly ties the tax revenue to the LTE, that is, to
K1(r) = b1(r): However, this LTE, as argued above, is only the LTE under the
assumption that governmental uncertainty has been removed. This LTE is, of course,
not the same as the LTE that would result from the behavior of agents facing the
uncertainty over governmental form. We now turn to B.
Agents believe Bs objective is to choose f 2 [t; f0] to maximize its tax revenue
minus the xed cost of maintaining the status quo. If B were to come into existence,
the agents would clearly know this and agent a would again have to evaluate the
conditions under which he would hide or not hide funds from taxation. These eval-
uations would lead to the results of subsection 2.1 above when  is set equal to 0:
That is, under B,  a = 1 if a  tf and 0 otherwise. Let b2(f) = tf : Bs tax revenue
is also composed of revenue from honestly run rms as well as from penalties levied
when tax evaders are caught. Thus its tax revenue T2(f) =
1R
0
[fa a + t(1    a)]dH:
Evaluating the revenue and subtracting the xed cost of the status quo, C(0); we
have that Bs objective function is t  1
2
t2
f
  C(0): Since this expression is increasing
in f , B maximizes its objective function by choosing f  = f0:
Having determined r and f , the agents now evaluate  = (r; f ): Then, using
this value, the agents can calculate b = b(; r; f ) and subsequently  a: Collectively,
the choices of the agents yield the LTE K = K(; r; f ) = b:
2.4. Example
To illustrate the results derived above, we now present a special case of the model
that brings the two governments under consideration into clearer focus. In this special
case, we assume that the penalty chosen by B is the same as that adopted by G, i.e.,
that f  = f0 = 1 + : With this simplifying assumption, each agent is reduced to
comparing a growth rate optimally chosen by G with the status quo maintained by
B.
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Since the cost function C(r) is independent of the tax revenue T1(r); then any r
can be chosen in this example by judiciously selecting the cost function. The most
interesting results derived in the propositions above occur when r < t=(1  t): Thus,
in this example, we set r =  t
1 t where 
 < 1:
To further simplify the notation of this example, we write 1 +  in units of the
tax rate, i.e., we set f  = f0 = 1 +  = nt with n > 1: With this assumption
and change of notation, the equation of  in P2 part (b) becomes linear and yields
(r; f ) = n 1
n  : Using the denition of b(; r; f) given in P1 and the fact that
K(; r; f) = b(; r; f) in our model, it follows for this example that K(; r; f ) =
b(; r; f ) = 1 

n  : Finally, from P1, 

a = 1 if a <
1 
n  and 

a = 0; otherwise.
For this example, no matter which r is chosen by G, neither government will
ever be the unambiguous choice of the agents, i.e., 0 < (r; f ) < 1; for r >
 1: Reecting this observation is the fact that there will always be some LTE, i.e.,
K(; r; f ) > 0; no matter the value of r: This is also shown in the value of  a
where there are always agents for whom  a = 1:
Now consider an increasing sequence of n values and, correspondingly, a sequence
of cost functions that, for each of these n values, yields r = 0; i.e.,  = 0: This
produces a sequence of  and K values. The sequence of  values is strictly
increasing in n and the sequence of K values is strictly decreasing in n:When r = 0;
the growth rate is the same for G and B, yet  = 1=2 only if n = 2: The reason for
this is that K = 1=2 only for n = 2: The value of  will increase or decrease from
1=2 as K decreases or increases from 1=2: This is consistent with our assumption
that agents, before having made their choices, consider both growth and tax evasion
in their determination of : These properties of the example can be shown to hold in
the general case.
The conclusions of the last paragraph do not hold if we keep the cost function xed
and increase the value of n; since in this case, T1(r) will change and, as a consequence,
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r 6= 0: Thus, we need a di¤erent approach to explore the consequences of changing
parameter values in our model. We address this in the next section.
2.5. Comparative Statics: rand f 
In order to investigate how changes in the fundamental parameters ; t; and f0 would
a¤ect the LTE or the support the agents might provide for a particular government,
we must rst analyze how the governments choices of r and f ; respectively, change
with these parameters. In what follows, the subscript  under a function denotes
partial di¤erentiation with respect to the subscripted variable.
Proposition 5. For  = ; t; or f0; signdr

d
= signT1(r
):
Using P4, we di¤erentiate T1(r) and, depending in which region r is found, we
can determine the sign of dr

d
as required by P5. We focus on the sign since, as can be
seen in the proof of P5, the magnitude of dr

d
depends on the reciprocal of T1  Cr
and therefore can have any value depending on the specic specications of the model.
This leads to the next proposition.
Proposition 6. (a) dr

d
 0 for all r except for r 2 f[t  (1+)]=(1  t); t=(1+ t)g
where dr

d
< 0:
(b) dr

dt
 0 for all r except for r 2 f[t   (1 + )]=(1   t); 1g and for r 2
fmin[(1 +    t)=t; t=(1  t)]; t=(1  t)g where dr
dt
< 0:
(c) dr

df0
= 0 for all r:
(d) df

dt
= 0; df

d
= 0 for all f0 except when f0 = 1 +  where
df
d
> 0:
(e) df

df0
> 0:
In parts (a)-(c) of P6, we consider changes in r with respect to changes in the
parameters. As such, we are considering the agentsproblem from the view point of
G having come into existence. In part (a) we show that generally an increase in the
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penalty for tax evasion allows G1 to increase r: There is, however, an exception to
this, that occurs when the r that G can a¤ord falls into the negative range given in
part (a). The attempt to increase the penalty in this range reduces r since raising
the penalty has two impacts. One is to increase revenue and the other is to decrease
the LTE. In this range, an agent who was hiding funds and was caught and who would
have paid G the additional amount d is now honest, and pays the tax of t(1 + r):
Since r here is negative, part (a) establishes that the net e¤ect to G is negative.
In part (b) of P6, we nd that an increase in the tax rate generally allows G
to choose a large r: This is not true when r 2 f[t   (1 + )]=(1   t); 1g; where
for similar reasons as discussed in the paragraph above, dr

d
< 0: However, in part
(b), there is a second possible interval, r 2 fmin[1 +    t]=t; t=(1   t)); t=(1   t)g
where dr

dt
< 0: This interval vanishes unless [(1 +    t)=t] < [t=(1   t)] or when
t > =[(1 + )=(2 + )]: For r > 0; increasing t has two e¤ects, increasing revenue and
increasing the LTE. Thus, an agent who was hiding none of the rms funds from
taxation, and would have paid the additional amount of taxes dt(1 + r); would now
hide funds and, if caught, pay 1+ : Depending on the size of r; the net e¤ect of this
change could be either positive or negative, but part (b) establishes the relationship
between t and  that causes the net e¤ect on G to be negative. In sum, parts (a)
and (b) imply that the normal intuition that raising taxes, whether on tax evaders
() or on honest agents (t), will increase revenues and therefore the options of G,
is correct. However, parts (a) and (b) also imply that this intuition is incorrect in
extreme cases as specied in the proposition. In these extreme cases, the raising of
taxes could worsen the situation. Since r does not depend on f0; part (c) follows.
In parts (d) and (e) agents are considering the problem from the viewpoint of B
having come into existence. Since f  = f0; parts (d) and (e) follow.
Having established how r changes with changes in the parameters of the model,
we next examine how the LTE would correspondingly change. Then we introduce
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the concept of a specic type of capital ight into our model and investigate how it
would change with parametric changes.
2.6. Comparative Statics: LTE and a type of Capital Flight
Because agents are uncertain as to the future form of government and its policies,
hiding funds from taxation may occur and, as we showed above, this leads to a
LTE of K: Of the funds hidden from taxation, some were not recaptured by the
government and remained undetected. Below, we will suppose that these undetected
hidden funds form the basis of capital ight. Of course capital ight can occur for
any number of reasons, most beyond the scope of this model, and need entail no
illegal action. Furthermore, tax evasion is not necessary for capital ight. However,
to facilitate our discussion of the use to which the undetected hidden funds might be
put in the context of our model, we will make reference to these undetected hidden
funds as the basis of capital ight, recognizing that this is an over-simplication of
a complex topic. In this section we are concerned with how the LTE changes with
changes in our parameters ; t and f0; and, subsequently, with the impact of changes
in the LTE on what we refer to as capital ight. We begin by studying the LTE.
Proposition 7. Under P6,
(a) dK

d
< 0 if r =2 f[t  (1 + )]=(1  t); t=(1 + t)g:
(b) There exists a constant r0 with r0 <  1 such that dKdt > 0 if r is either
fmax[r0; (t  (1 + ))=(1  t)]; 1g or fmin[(1 +   t)=t); t=(1  t)]; t=(1  t)g: When
r is in neither interval, signdK

dt
can be positive or negative depending on parameter
values.
(c) dK

df0
< 0:
The function K = b depends on  in possibly four ways: through ; through
r; through f ; and directly through : Thus, the sign of dK

d
must reconcile the
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contributions of each of these four ingredients. We interpret part (a) rst. Although
some of these ingredients are of opposite signs, when r =2 f[t (1+)]=(1 t); t=(1+
t)g their sum is always negative. Marginally, increasing  causes a decrease in the
LTE. An agent who had been a tax evader and would have provided a penalty to
G if caught, would now be honest and would pay taxes. The di¤erence of these two
payments to G is what G gains as  is increased. Usually, the tax contribution is
larger than the penalty contribution from the caught tax evader, yielding an increase
in revenue. Thus, both an increase in  and an increase in revenue produce a decline
in the LTE. However, when r is in the interval f[t   (1 + )]=(1   t); t=(1 + t)g;
the net e¤ect of these two payments is negative, causing r to decline. The e¤ect
of this is marginally to increase the LTE. Thus, there are two opposing forces, one
to increase and one to decrease the LTE. The reconciliation of these two forces here
depends on the parameter values. Thus, if one were considering reducing tax evasion
by increasing the penalty for hiding funds from taxation, it would be important to
take into consideration the state of economic development to avoid worsening the
situation. In particular, in those economies very negative growth rates (for example,
some of the economies in transition during specic periods, or otherwise, for example,
Greece during the euro crisis), controlling tax evasion by increasing penalties might
be counter-productive.
We now turn to part (b). Let r in part (b) be in the interval fmax[r0; (t  (1 +
))=(1 t)]; 1g: Examining the form of K = b; a marginal increase in t causes b to
increase. Also, from P6, we showed that an increase in t causes r to fall, marginally
causing b to rise. Thus, unambiguously, the LTE rises. In the positive interval, if
it exists, again the marginal e¤ect of t is to increase the LTE. From P7, since r
declines with t, this latter e¤ect also causes b to increase and thus unambiguously
the LTE increases with t: Outside these two intervals, the marginal e¤ect on t and its
consequences on r yield opposite e¤ects on the total LTE that can only be resolved
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with knowledge of the particular parametric values. The di¢ culty of assigning a sign
to dK

dt
for most values of r stems from the assumption of convenience that we made
at the outset that t is the common tax rate for both G and B. Since f0 enters b only
through f  and since b declines with f ; part (c) follows.
In the discussion following P7, the contribution of  to the change in K was
not mentioned. Since at optimality,  = 1   K;  was absorbed into K in this
discussion.
We next assume that a portion of the undetected hidden funds leave the country
as a type of capital ight. For ease of presentation, in what follows we assume that
capital ight, denoted by F; is equal to the total undetected hidden funds.
From earlier discussions, F =
1R
0
(1  a) adH =
bR
0
(1  a)dH = b  b2
2
= 1 [1 K
]2
2
if 0 < b  1 and F = 0 otherwise: This enables us to describe changes in F in terms
of changes in the LTE which we do next.
Proposition 8. For  = ; t; or f0;
dF
d
=
8<: 0 if r  t=(1  t)(1 K)dK
d
if r < t=(1  t)
:
P8 establishes the direct connection between our denition of capital ight and
the LTE and, in particular, how changes in the one induce changes in the other.
When r > t=(1  t); all agents are honest, the LTE is zero, and small changes in ;
t; and f0; cause no change in capital ight. When r  (t=1   t), changes in capital
ight will occur and depend on the LTE and its derivative. We next ascertain the
direction of this change.
Proposition 9. Let r < t=(1  t); then
(a) dF
d
< 0 if r =2 f[t  (1 + )]=(1  t); t=(1 + t)g:
(b) dF
dt
> 0 if r is in either fmax[r0; [t   (1 + )]=(1   t)]; 1g or fmin[(1 +   
t)=t; t=(1  t)]; t=(1  t)g where r0 is given in P7. When r is in neither interval, the
sign of dF
dt
can be positive or negative, depending on the parameters.
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(c) dF
df0
< 0:
Since signdF
d
= signdK

d
; the discussion following P7 is pertinent to all of the
results of P9. It is worth noting again that an attempt to control capital ight by
raising the penalty on agents hiding funds from taxation might fail if the attempt
is made in an economy with a su¢ ciently negative growth rate. Similarly, a rise in
the tax rate can also have undesired consequences on capital ight depending on the
state of the economy.
3. Discussion and Conclusions
We presented a model of agents facing political uncertainty who were able to insure
against this uncertainty by hiding funds from taxation. By allowing agents this choice,
the LTE in society emerged and dominated the discussions of all of the features of the
model. Not only did the LTE have the usual interpretation, but it also was a major
factor in determining tax revenues that the potential governments could expect. As a
consequence, the LTE also became an important factor in the optimum choices of the
governments. Our model suggests that in a world in which such tax evasion options
exist, ignoring them may bias conclusions and policy implications.
A feature of our model worth noting is that of asymmetric information. When
agents confront the decision to hide funds from taxation, they face two sources of
uncertainty: Not knowing which government will come into being and not knowing
if they would be caught if they hid funds from taxation. Based on these two sources
of uncertainty, the model determined the LTE that would ensue. But there were two
other levels of tax evasion that were also involved in the model. When the agents
assumed that G, having come into being, optimized its objective function subject
to its scal constraint, G needed to anticipate the LTE since this level was part
of its objective function, as well as a contributor to its tax revenue. But agents
22
facing G, assuming it had come into existence, have only one source of uncertainty
to contend with, namely, the uncertainty of being caught when hiding funds from
taxation. Therefore, the LTE as perceived by G in this circumstance is di¤erent from
that as perceived by the agents before imagining G had come into existence. Similarly,
another LTE was determined when agents imagined B had come into existence. Since
the agents need to know the optimum choices of the governments before they can make
their own choices, it follows that the actual tax revenue produced by the agents would
not be the tax revenue used by the governments to optimize their choices, and that
the levels of tax evasion produced by the agents would not be the ones used by the
governments to optimize their choices. While, for example, it is always true that
the LTE produced by the agents under full uncertainty is between those conceived
of by G and B, the relative sizes of these latter two levels of tax evasion depend on
information that is not available to either government. The implications of these
discrepancies remain to be analyzed.
In the model, two assumptions were made concerning the ways the set of agents
select the subjective probability, ; that G will come into existence. First, we as-
sumed that the more agents believed that G could obtain its objectives, the higher 
would be, and conversely. The second assumption was to set  equal to a particular
function that was shown to move in accordance with Gs objectives. These two as-
sumptions permitted us to endogenize the value of  and to proceed to analyze the
full model. Obviously, the particular function we chose might have been di¤erent,
but if it still satised our rst assumption, then we believe that the results would not
have substantially changed.
The importance of the LTE in our model is underscored by its complexity. We
showed that, among other things, the LTE depended on ; the agreed upon proba-
bility that G would come into existence, r; the growth rate chosen by G, and f , the
penalty rate chosen by B. All of these optimized values depended on the perceived
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behavior of groups of agents and the structural values dening each government. Be-
cause of the importance of the LTE in policy-making, governments might consider
controlling this level by altering the structural values. The result of our study shows
that changes in these values do not necessarily yield desirable changes in the LTE.
That is, due to the complexity just mentioned, changes in the structural values can
lead to unintended changes in the LTE. Also, since what we term capital ight in our
model is directly related to the LTE, it follows that attempts to control it by altering
structural values should be done in light of these possible unintended consequences.
Our model was formulated to explain some of the challenges faced by agents in
the economies in transition. To that end, we derive, among other things, the LTE
in a particular stylized country. But how can the model speak of di¤erent levels
of tax evasion in di¤erent countries more generally? We answer this question by
thinking of an economy as made up of three elements: First, the structural form of
possible future governments faced by the agents, second, the distribution of agents
skills H(a); and third, the cost C(r) in the economy of achieving a growth rate r:
These elements need to be chosen to match the characteristics of a given country.
For example, the two possible governmental outcomes could involve less benevolent
options and more draconian options. Also, a country might initially be more corrupt
than another and thus H(a) might increase faster for the more corrupt country.
Finally, one country could initially be poorer than another, or less able to attract
or be granted funds, implying that its cost of improving the infrastructure would
be larger. Specifying these values for a given country, we would proceed in the
development of the corresponding model. However, depending on how far aeld
these elements are from those assumed in our model, the development itself might
become more complex. For example, if H(a) were specied not to be uniform but
to be convex, the development would go through essentially unchanged. But, more
complicated specications of these distribution might lead to multiple solutions and
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the problems associated with those solutions. However, by changing the form of these
three elements, singly or in combination, while maintaining the essential argument
developed in this paper, we are able to o¤er a partial explanation for the di¤erences in
crime levels, capital ight and growth rates in the economies in transition. We hope
that others might take an interest in our approach and use it as a basis for empirical
studies.
4. Appendix
Proof of P1. Agent a will choose  a = argmax[E(0);max0<a1E(a)]: (A tie in
expected values is assumed to lead agent a to be honest.) Since E(a) is linear in
a; agent a will choose a = 0 or a = 1: The intercept of this line is less than E(0):
This follows by setting a = 0 in equation 2.1, and comparing that result to E(0);
noting that f 2 [t; f0]: Thus, a necessary and su¢ cient condition that  a = 1 is
E(a = 1)  E(0) > 0: Using equations 2.1 and 2.2,
E(a = 1)  E(0) = (1  )[a(1  f) + (1  a)(1  t)  (1  t)] + t
 (1  t)r   a[t+ (1 +    t)]
= t  (1  t)r   a[t+ (1 +    t) + (1  t)(1  )]
= t  (1  t)r   a[f + (1 +    f))]:
This last expression is positive if and only if a < t (1 t)r
f+(1+ f) : Thus, 

a = 1 if the
last inequality holds and  a = 0 otherwise.
Proof of P2. Let r = t=(1   t): Then b(; r; f) = t(1 )
f+(1+ f)  0: Substituting
b(; r; f) forK() in the equation  = 1 K() yields the equation  = 1  t(1 )
f+(1+ f)
which has  = 1 as its solution. For r > t=(1 t); b(; r; f) is negative at  = 1: Thus,
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K() = 0 at  = 1 so that  = 1   K() has the solution  = 1: This establishes
part (a).
To show part (b), we note that for r < t=(1   t); b(; r; f) > 0: Substituting
b(; r; f) = t (1 t)r
f+(1+ f) for K() in the equation  = 1  K(); multiplying through
by f + (1 +    f) and collecting terms we get that (r; f) must satisfy
(f   1  )2   [f   (1 +    f)  (1  t)r] + f   t = 0:
This parabola equals f   t at  = 0 and equals  [t   (1   t)r] at  = 1: Since
f 2 [t; f0]; f   t  0: Since r < t=1  t;  [t  (1  t)r] < 0: Thus, the parabola has a
unique root in [0; 1]:
Proof of P3. Part (a): If r  t=(1   t); then from P2, (r; f) = 1 and
b[(r; f); r; f ]  0: Thus, for all a 2 [0; 1]; a  b[(r; f); r; f ] and by P1,  a = 0
for all a:
Part (b): If r < t=(1  t); then 0  1  (r; f) = b[(r; f); r; f ]  1: Substituting
into P1 yields the result.
Proof of P4. From Gs perspective, agent a chooses  a = 1 iff a < b1(r); and
 a = 0 otherwise. Since b1(r)  0 for r  t=(1   t); all agents are honest in this
range. Because they are honest, they each pay full taxes t(1 + r): Since b1(r)  1
for r  t (1+)
1 t ; all agents are tax evaders in this range. Because all agents are tax
evaders, agent a is caught with probability a and pays (1 + ): Collectively, they pay
1Z
0
a(1 + )dH = 1+
2
: For t (1+)
1 t < r < t=(1  t); 0 < b1(r) < 1: Thus,
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T1(r) =
1Z
0
a a(1 + )dH +
1Z
0
t(1   a)(1 + r)dH
=
b1(r)Z
0
a(1 + )dH +
1Z
b1(r)
t(1 + r)dH
=
(1 + )
2
b21(r) + t(1 + r)[1  b1(r)]:
Proof of P5. r is the largest value of r satisfying T1(r)   C(r) = 0: Thus,
T1(r
)  C(r) = 0: The parameter  ( = ; t; or f0) appears in T1(r) in two ways,
through r and directly through : The parameter  appears in C(r) through r only.
Therefore, by di¤erentiation, T1r dr

d
+ T1   Cr drd = 0 or (T1r   Cr)dr

d
=  T1:
Since r is the largest r satisfying this equation, the slope of the cost function must
exceed that of the tax revenue function at r: The result follows.
Proof of P6.
Part (a). For the left interval r  t (1+)
1 t ; T1(r
) = 1+
2
: Applying the result of
P5, dr

d
= 1=2: For the middle interval t (1+)
1 t  r  t=(1  t); T1(r) = (1+)2 b21(r)+
t(1 + r)[1  b1(r)]: Then, T1(r) = b
2
1(r
)
2
+ [(1 + )b1(r
)  t(1 + r)]b1r(r): Since
b1(r
) = t (1 t)r

1+
; we have T1(r) = 12 [
t (1 t)r
1+
]2  [t  (1  t)r  t(1+ r)] t (1 t)r
(1+)2
=
t (1 t)r
2(1+)2
[t  (1  t)r + 2r]
= t (1 t)r

2(1+)2
[t+ r(1 + t)]: Thus, dr

d
< 0 if t (1+)
1 t  r <  t=(1 + t) and dr

d
 for
 t=(1 + t)  r  t=(1   t): In the right interval, r > t=(1   t); T1(r) = t(1 + r)
and dr

d
= 0: Thus, looking over all regions, dr

d
< 0 only if t (1+)
1 t  r   t(1 + t)
and part (a) follows.
Part (b). In the left interval T1(r) =
(1+)
2
so dr

dt
= 0: In the middle interval
T1t(r
) = (1 + r)[(1  b1(r)] + [(1 + )b1(r)  t(1 + r)]b1t(r)
= 1+r

1+
[1 +    t+ (1  t)r]  [r]1+r
1+
= 1+r

1+
[1 +    t(1 + r)]
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= (1 + r)   t
1+
(1 + r)2: This quadratic is zero at r =  1 and at r = 1+ t
t
and is positive in between. Thus, dr

dt
 0 for r in f 1;min[1+ t
t
; t
1 t ]g and is
negative for r inf [t (1+)]
1 t ; 1g: In the right interval T1(r) = t(1 + r) so dr

dt
> 0
here. Thus, over all regions, dr

dt
 0 everywhere except for r 2 f [t (1+)]
1 t ; 1g and
for r 2 fmin[1+ t
t
; t
1 t ]g: This establishes part (b).
Part (c) follows since r does not depend on f0:
Part (d) The rst part of part (d) follows since f  does not depend on t: If
f0 6= 1+ ; then f  does not depend on  and dfd = 0: If f0 = 1+ ; then df

d
= 1 > 0
and part (d) follows.
Part (e) follows since f  = f0:
Proof of P7. The LTE K = K[; r; f ; ] where  = ; t or f0: Thus, dK

d
=
K
d
d
+Kr
dr
d
+Kf
df
d
+K: As was shown in the proof of P2, for r > t=(1  t);
b < 0; and K = 0: It follows that when r > t=(1  t); dK
d
= 0 for  = ; t or f:We
now consider the case when r  t=(1  t): Since  = 1 K; we have d
d
=  dK
d
:
Substituting this expression above, we have (1 +K)
dK
d
= Kr
dr
d
+Kf
df
d
+K :
As a result of our assumption that H(a) is uniform, K = b; and the last expression
can be written as (1+ b)
dK
d
= br
dr
d
+ bf
df
d
+ b:We rst show that (1+ b

) > 0:
Since f  = f0  1 +  and r < t=(1   t); 1 + b = 1 + t(f
 1 ) f(1 t)r
[f (f 1 )]2 
1+ t(f
 1 ) ft
[f]2 = 1  t(1+)[f]2 > 0: So we have that signdK

d
= sign[br
dr
d
+bf
df
d
+b]:
We use this expression in the following evaluations.
We rst note that since b = t 
(1 t)r
f(1 )+(1+) it follows that b

r < 0; b

f < 0; and
b < 0: Now let  = : Then sign
dK
d
= sign[br
dr
d
+ bf
df
d
+ b ]: Since b

r ; b

f ; and b


are all negative, all terms would be negative if dr

d
and df

d
are non-negative. From P6,
dr
d
is non-negative everywhere except for r 2 f t (1+)
1 t ;  t1 tg and df

d
is non-negative
everywhere. Thus part (a) follows.
Now let  = t: Then signdK

dt
= sign[br
dr
dt
+ bf
df
dt
+ bt ]: From P6, we have
df
dt
= 0: Di¤erentiating b with respect to t shows that bt is a positive multiple of
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1 + r which is positive at r =  1 and since from P2,  < 1; there will exist an
r0 <  1 such that 1 + r  0 for r  r0: Since br < 0; dK

dt
will be positive where
dr
dt
< 0 and where 1 + r  0: Using P6, part (b) follows.
Finally, let  = f0: From P6, dr

df0
= 0 and b does not explicitly depend on f0:
Furthermore, both df

df0
> 0 and bf < 0; thus sign
dK
df0
< 0:
Proof of P8. As was shown in the text, F = 1 (1 K
)2
2
when b > 0 and 0
otherwise. As argued in the proof of P2, b > 0 if r < t=(1   t) and is negative
otherwise. So
F =
8<: 0 if r  t=(1  t)1 (1 K)2
2
if r < t=(1  t)
:
Di¤erentiation with respect to ;  = ; t or f0 yields the result.
Proof of P9. Prom P8, we have that signdF
d
= signdK

d
: Using P7, the result
follows.
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